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I.

INTRODUCTION
Patents are a powerful tool because they allow their owners to exclude others

from the use of the patented technology and charge prices well above competitive
levels. In the pharmaceutical industry, patents have long created contention
between drug manufacturers, who regard them as essential to protect their
investments in the development of new drugs, and consumer advocates, who regard
the inflated prices as an obstacle to widespread drug access. In recent years,
settlements to pharmaceutical patent infringement litigation, and specifically the
so-called “reverse payment” settlements, have provided a new battleground for this
debate.
The Supreme Court recently confronted the issue of reverse payment
settlements in F.T.C. v. Actavis. The Court’s decision has once again raised the
question of whether patents are the most appropriate form of intellectual property
protection for the pharmaceutical industry. Technological innovation is a key aspect
of the pharmaceutical sector from both an economic and a medical perspective.
Promoting innovation in the pharmaceutical industry benefits both drug
manufacturers and consumers, but finding the correct balance between the
interests of those two groups has proven to be a challenge. This paper seeks to
explore these challenges. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides the
necessary regulatory and judicial background surrounding pharmaceutical patents
and reverse payment settlements to understand pharmaceutical patent litigation.
Section III describes the process of pharmaceutical innovation, the effects of generic
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competition, and the role of pharmaceutical patents. Finally, section IV highlights
some of the effects of the current regulatory scheme on the rate of pharmaceutical
innovation and presents some alternative incentive structures that could substitute
or augment the intellectual property protection given by pharmaceutical patents.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
A.

Statutory regulation of the pharmaceutical market

The pharmaceutical market is one of the most regulated industries in the
United States.1 No one can legally sell a new drug without first gaining the
approval of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).2 In order to gain FDA
approval for a pioneer drug – that is one that has never before received FDA
approval – an applicant must file a New Drug Application (“NDA”).3 The NDA must
contain detailed information about the new drug – including its chemical
composition, its method of production, and the reports of the clinical trials showing
its safety and efficacy – as well as information on any patent related to it.4 If the
FDA approves the NDA, it publishes the drug and patent information in the
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence and Evaluations or what is
commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.”5

1.
Emily M. Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 245,
251 (2012).
2.
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
3.
Id. at § 355(b)(1).
4.
Id.
5.
Id. at § 355(j)(7)(A)(i)-(iii).
2

B.

The Hatch-Waxman Act

In an effort to promote competition, Congress enacted in 1984 the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, commonly known as the HatchWaxman Act.6 The Act streamlined the approval process for generic versions of
pioneer drugs already approved and included in the Orange Book.7 Specifically,
generic firms can elect to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”)
which simply requires that the applicant prove the generic drug’s “bioequivalence”8
with the branded product.9 Generic firms, therefore, no longer have to reproduce the
lengthy and costly clinical trials needed to prove the safety and efficacy of their
products.10 Rather, they can capitalize on the information submitted by the brandname manufacturer in the original NDA application.11 Consequently, the HatchWaxman Act aids competition in that it reduces the time and cost of bringing new
generic drugs to the market.12
The Hatch-Waxman Act awards a five-year period of data exclusivity during
6.
21 U.S.C. § 355.
7.
Id. at § 355(j).
8.
Bioequivalence refers to “the rate and extent to which the active
ingredient or therapeutic ingredient is absorbed from a drug and becomes available
at the site of drug action.” Id. at § 355 (j)(8)(A)(i).
9.
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and
Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals, 28 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION
ECON. 491, 491-492 (2007).
10.
Lee Branstetter et al., Starving (or Fattening) the Golden Goose?:
Generic Entry and the Incentives for Early-Stage Pharmaceutical Innovation,
(August 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jeffrey_kuhn/Innovation
_Seminar/Papers/Branstetter_Chatterjee_Higgins_2.pdf.
11.
Grabowski, supra note 9, at 492.
12.
Bret Dickey et al., An Economic Assessment of Patent Settlements in
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 367, 371 (2010).
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which generic drugs may not be marketed.13 However, the Act – through what are
known as Paragraph IV certifications – allows generic manufacturers to file an
ANDA after only four years from the brand-name drug’s approval and well before
the expiration of the patents on the brand-name product.14 Notably, the first generic
manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV certification receives a 180-day market
exclusivity period.15 This timeframe provides a powerful incentive for generic
manufacturers to challenge, or invent around, brand-name patents because the
profits available during the 180-day exclusivity period can be substantial.16
C.

Patent litigation in the context of the Hatch-Waxman Act

An ANDA filer that makes a Paragraph IV certification commits a
constructive act of patent infringement.17 The Hatch-Waxman Act requires the filer
to notify the patent holder of the filing of the Paragraph IV certification and
provides the brand-name manufacturer 45 days to bring an action for patent
infringement.18 If an action is brought within this time period, the patent holder is

13.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(E)(ii). Data exclusivity refers to the period of
time a generic manufacturer has to wait before being allowed access to the clinical
trial data submitted as part of the pioneer drug’s NDA.
14.
Id.; id. at § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
15.
Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I). This exclusivity period is triggered
by the marketing of the first filer’s generic product. Dickey, supra note 12, at 373.
16.
Dickey, supra note 12, at 373. During those 180 days the brand-name
and the first generic filer will partake in a duopoly, allowing the first generic filer
(1) to set prices only slightly below monopolistic values; and (2) to capture a much
larger share of the market than it would if facing competition from multiple
generics.
17.
Bruce R. Genderson, Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Act Patent
Litigation: Resolving Conflicting Intellectual Property and Antitrust Concerns, 3
SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 45 (2002).
18.
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii).
4

granted an automatic stay of the ANDA approval, which prevents the generic drug
from entering the market.19 The stay will last until the litigation is resolved in favor
of the ANDA filer or the end of a 30-month period from the Paragraph IV
notification, whichever comes first.20 Because of the automatic stay, the patent
litigation will take place before the generic drug is allowed to enter the market.21
This situation differs drastically from the more typical patent dispute. Commonly, a
patent holder brings an action against an alleged infringer that is actively utilizing
the patented technology without the consent of the patent holder.22 Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, however, a generic manufacturer can challenge the validity of
a brand-name patent without the risk of being liable for the damages caused by
actual infringement.23
D.

“Reverse payment” settlements agreements

A great number of patent litigations result in settlements.24 The litigation
risks involved are extremely high for both the alleged infringer, who risks treble
damages that can reach hundreds of millions of dollars, and the patent holder, who
risks an equally costly finding of patent invalidity.25 Also, because of the complexity
of the technologies and of the legal issues involved, the outcome of patent litigation
is remarkably uncertain – not only at trial but also on appeal, where reversal rates
19.
Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)(aa).
20.
Id.
21.
Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse
Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L. J. 1033 (2004).
22.
Id. at 1036
23.
Genderson, supra note 17, at 45.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
5

are quite high.26
In a Hatch-Waxman context, parties have an even greater incentive to
settle.27 The peculiar nature of a Paragraph IV-induced litigation gives rise to a
situation of exceptionally asymmetric risks between the litigants. On the one hand,
the generic manufacturer has a strong economic incentive to adopt risk-seeking
behavior.28 It faces the possibility of enormous gains in the event of a successful
challenge for a relatively small price – because there have yet to be any sales of the
generic drug, damages will be minimal, leaving litigation costs as the only
expense.29 On the other hand, the brand name is often risk-averse because it has
much to lose and nothing to gain.30 If it prevails, it will be left in essentially the
same economic position it had before the litigation, while if it loses its patentgranted monopoly profits will be lost.31
Furthermore, parties in a Hatch-Waxman Act patent litigation have, for the
most part, an incentive to settle on monetary terms.32 Such incentive originates
from the fact that, holding constant the value received by the generic manufacturer,
a settlement based on a license will cost the patent holder much more than a
26.
Id. at 46. Depending on the type of claim, patent litigation reversal
rates range between 10 and 38% against an average for all areas of federal civil
litigation of 18%. Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1172-1173 (2010).
27.
Genderson, supra note 10, at 46.
28.
Xiang Yu & Anjan Chatterji, Why Brand Pharmaceutical Companies
Choose to Pay Generics in Settling Patent Disputes: A Systematic Evaluation of the
Asymmetric Risks in Litigation, 10 NW. J. TECH. AND INTELL. PROP. 19, 21 (2011).
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Genderson, supra note 10, at 47.
6

monetary settlement.33 In contrast to the typical patent litigation settlement,
however, in the Hatch-Waxman context the payment often flows from the patent
holder to the alleged infringer – hence the name “reverse payment.”34 These
settlements have raised much debate and many economists have written on the
issue. Numerous economists agree that, when real-world complexities are taken
into account, reverse payments provide the parties in the litigation the negotiation
flexibility necessary to reach pro-consumer settlements.35 The Federal Trade
Commission (“F.T.C.”) and several consumer advocacy groups, on the other hand,
have challenged the legality of reverse payment agreements.36 The F.T.C. regards a
reverse payment as the parties’ effort to conspire to monopolize the market for a
33.
Id. at 46. A license to the generic would immediately lower the price at
which the brand name is able to sell its product. This loss of monopolistic profits
would unlikely be matched by any royalties agreed to as part of the settlement.
34.
Id.
35.
Dickey, supra note 12, at 392-393. See also Yu & Chatterji, supra note
28, at 31 (noting that reverse payments are, in large part, a byproduct of the
asymmetric litigation risks between the parties); Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey
Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the
New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent
Litigation, 96 IOWA L. R. 101, 156 (2010)(concluding that reverse payment can have
anticompetitive as well as procompetitive outcomes depending on the surrounding
circumstances). But see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34
RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003)(claiming that reverse payments can never produce
pro-consumer outcomes). There is, however, a profound difference in the
methodology employed by Shapiro and those following his model. This group of
scholars reaches their conclusions by using the concept of “probabilistic patents.”
Because, they say, there is always a chance that a jury would invalidate a patent, a
patent does not confer a right to exclude but rather a right to try to exclude by
asserting the patent in court. While intriguing from a mathematical perspective,
the concept of “probabilistic rights” has serious flaws when confronted with the rule
of law. A very good discussion on the topic can be found in Kevin D. McDonald,
Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights
and False Positives, 17 ANTITRUST 68, 71-72 (2003).
36.
Yu & Chatterji, supra note 28, at 22.
7

particular drug and considers them a violation of the Sherman Act.37
E.

Challenges to the legality of reverse payment settlements

Reverse settlement agreements have been challenged under antitrust
principles in various federal courts. The challenges resulted in conflicting opinions
from different circuit courts. The Second Circuit adopted a policy in favor of
settlement; the Federal Circuit concluded that the agreements are presumed lawful
unless they extend beyond the patent exclusivity zone; the Eleventh Circuit
developed a framework intended to ascertain the appropriate exclusionary zone of
the patent; while the Third Circuit adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis.38
1.

Second Circuit: In re Tamoxifen

The Second Circuit considered the issue of reverse payment settlements in In

37.
The Sherman Act imputes criminal and civil liability to any person
who “shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations . . . ” 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
38.
Antitrust analysis distinguishes between certain types of practices
considered inherently anticompetitive, such as price fixing, and “per se” illegal and
other practices analyzed under a more flexible balancing test known as the “rule of
reason.” WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK, §2:9 (2008). The rule of
reason is a totality of the circumstances analysis aimed at ascertaining whether the
challenged practice imposes unreasonable restraints on competition. Id. at §2:10.
Relevant factors can include the defendants’ intent, the structure of the relevant
market, or the market power of the defendants. Id. An abbreviated version of the
rule of reason, the “quick look” approach, is used in circumstances when the
anticompetitive effects of the practice are so intuitively obvious as to be clear
without a detailed market analysis. Id. Primarily, the quick look approach relieves
the government from rigorously identifying the relevant market, the defendants’
market power, or the anticompetitive effects of the practice. Id.
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re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation.39 The litigation involved a patent held by
Zeneca covering Tamoxifen, a widely-prescribed drug for the treatment of breast
cancer.40 The district court ruled in favor of the Paragraph IV filer, Barr, based on
fraud against the Patent and Trademark Office.41 While the appeal was pending,
the parties agreed to a settlement in which Barr would receive $21 million and a
non-exclusive license to sell Zeneca-manufactured Tamoxifen under Barr’s label,
and Barr’s supplier, Heumann, would receive payments of over $45 million over ten
years.42 In return, Barr agreed to change its Paragraph IV certification to a
Paragraph III certification – thereby agreeing not to enter the market until Zeneca’s
patent expired unless the patent was subsequently declared invalid due to litigation
with anther challenger.43
The agreement was challenged by various consumers, providers of medical
benefits, and consumer advocacy groups.44 The district court rejected the charges
and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.45 In affirming the district court’s

39.
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
40.
Id. at 193.
41.
Id. A finding of fraud against the PTO bars enforcement of a patent
thereby effectively invalidating the patent. See e.g. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
42.
Id. at 193-194.
43.
Id. Over the years following the agreement, three other generic
manufactures challenged the patent by filing a Paragraph IV certification, but each
time the courts upheld the validity of Zeneca’s patent. See Zeneca Ltd. v.
Novopharm Ltd., 111 F.3d 144, 1997 WL 168318, at *2–*4 (Fed. Cir. Apr.10,
1997)(unpublished opinion); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 2000 WL 34335805,
at *15 (D.Mass. Sept.11, 2000); AstraZeneca UK Ltd. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No.
00–2239, slip op. at 2–3 (W.D.Pa. Nov. 30, 2000).
44.
Id. at 196.
45.
Id. at 197.
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decision, the Second Circuit stressed how courts must encourage the settlement of
litigation and noted that restricting patent settlements might be contrary to the
goals of patent laws since increased uncertainty surrounding patents might harm
innovation.46 The court also rejected the argument that the settlements would allow
an invalid patent to remain in force and that reverse payments are inherently
anticompetitive.47 The court reasoned that, due to the inherent risk of litigation,
settlements of legitimate disputes intended to eliminate that risk should be allowed
and that a patent holder paying to protect its patent-granted monopoly, without
more, is not a violation of the Sherman Act.48
2.

Federal Circuit: In re Ciprofloxacin

The Federal Circuit considered the issue of reverse payment settlements in
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrocloride Antitrust Litigation.49 Just before trial, the parties
agreed to a settlement in which the generic manufacturer, Barr, agreed to cease
challenging the patent and delay market entry until six months prior to patent
expiration.50 In exchange, the patent owner, Bayer, agreed to pay Barr $49.1 million
and either supply it with the drug for resale or make quarterly payments for a
period of seven years.51 Advocacy groups challenged the agreement on antitrust

46.
Id. at 202-203.
47.
Id. at 204.
48.
Id. at 205.
49.
544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
50.
Id. at 1328-1329.
51.
Id. at 1329. In subsequent years, the validity of the patent was upheld
in court four times after other generic manufactures filed Paragraph IV ANDAs.
10

grounds.52
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
Federal Circuit affirmed.53 In doing so, the Federal Circuit distinguished the
Ciprofloxacin agreement from others where the restraints on the generic
manufacturer extended the patent exclusivity zone.54 The court concluded that,
when the anticompetitive effects of the settlement are “within the exclusionary
power of the patent,” the application of the rule of reason under antitrust law must
produce the same outcome as an analysis of the right to exclude granted by the
patent under patent law.55
3.

Eleventh Circuit: Watson Pharmaceuticals

The most recent appellate decision on reverse payments in the Eleventh
Circuit is the ruling in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.56 The original litigation
involved a Paragraph IV challenge to Solvay’s patent on AndroGel, a topical gel
used to treat low testosterone in men, by two generic manufacturers.57 The
litigation ended when the parties agreed to a settlement providing that the generic
manufacturers would (1) refrain from marketing their generic version of the drug
for a period of nine years; (2) promote the branded AndroGel to urologists; and (3)
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 1330, 1340.
54.
Id. at 1335. The court cited In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. where
(1) the generic manufacturer had not relinquished the 180-day exclusivity period,
thereby preventing other generic manufacturer form entering the market; and (2)
the generic agreed not to market non-infringing versions of the generic drug. 332
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
55.
Id. at 1336.
56.
677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
57.
Id. at 1303-1304.
11

serve as backup manufacturers.58 In exchange, Solvay agreed to pay $10 million a
year for six years – plus an additional $2 million a year for the backup
manufacturing – to one of the generic manufacturers and share some of its
AndroGel profits with the other.59 The F.T.C. filed an antitrust suit claiming the
settlement was an agreement not to compete and the district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.60
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rule it developed in three previous
decisions61 that, absent sham litigation of fraud, reverse payment settlements that
remain within the exclusionary zone of the patent are immune from antitrust
attacks.62 Furthermore, the court firmly rejected the F.T.C. argument that an
antitrust claim could be based on allegations that the patent holder was “not likely
to prevail” in the patent infringement action.63 Describing the F.T.C. argument as
equating a likely result – the invalidation of the patent – with an actual result, the
court remarked that “[p]redicting the future is precarious at best; retroactively
predicting from a past perspective a future that never occurred is even more
perilous.”64

58.
Id. at 1305.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 1306.
61.
The three decisions were: Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003); Schering–Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th
Cir. 2005); and Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005).
62.
Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1312.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 1313.
12

4.

Third Circuit: In re K–Dur

The Third Circuit addressed reverse payments in In re K–Dur Antitrust
Litigation.65 The brand manufacturer, Schering, held a patent on the controlledrelease coating used in K–Dur, its potassium chloride supplement.66 Two generic
manufacturers, Upsher and ESI Lederle, filed ANDAs providing Paragraph IV
certification compelling Schering to file suit to defend its patent.67 Both litigations
terminated with reverse payment agreements. The Schering-Upsher agreement
provided that Upsher would refrain from marketing its generic version of K–Dur, or
any similar product, for four years in exchange for a payment of $60 million.68 The
Schering-ESI agreement provided that ESI would not develop a potassium chloride
product and would receive in return $15 million and a non-exclusive license to K–
Dur starting eight years following the agreement.69
The F.T.C. filed a complaint against Schering, Upsher and ESI alleging that
the settlements unreasonably restrained commerce and that the reverse payments
intended to preserve Schering’s monopoly by delaying generic entry.70 In ruling in
favor of the F.T.C., the Third Circuit rejected the “scope of the patent” test as
granting an almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.71 Instead, the
court adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis in which a reverse payment

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 203.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 205-206.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 206-207.
Id. at 214.
13

constitutes prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, rebuttable
only “by showing that the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry
or (2) offers some pro-competitive benefit.”72
F.

The Supreme Court’s response in Actavis

In response to a deepening split among the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari in F.T.C. v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.73 The Court
reversed the near-automatic antitrust immunity provided by the Eleventh Circuit.74
Rather, the Court concluded that reverse payment settlements should be reviewed
under a full rule of reason analysis.75
The Court based the ruling that reverse settlements should be subject to
antitrust scrutiny on five sets of considerations.76 First, the Court noted that these
types of agreements have “the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition.”77 Second, while sometimes the agreements are justified – such as
when the payment is an approximation of litigation expenses saved through the
settlement, or reflects compensation for other services offered by the generic
manufacturer – when no such redeeming qualities are present the anticompetitive
effects might prove unduly harmful.78 Third, firms willing to make large payments
may possess market power – the ability to charge prices higher than the competitive

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 218.
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
Id. at 2237.
Id.
Id. at 2234.
Id.
Id. at 2236.
14

level.79 Fourth, normally there would be no need to litigate the patent’s validity in
order to answer the antitrust question because an “unexplained large reverse
payment” in itself can provide a proxy for an invalid patent.80 Fifth, the parties
have other means to settle the litigation that do not involve large and unjustified
reverse payments and are, therefore, not at risk of antitrust liability.81
Further, the Court refused the F.T.C.’s argument that reverse payment
settlements should be presumed unlawful. Rather than a “quick look” approach, the
Court held that reverse payments must be reviewed under a full rule of reason
analysis.82 A “quick look” approach, the Court reasoned, is appropriate only when
“an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the agreements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on consumers
and market.”83 Therefore, because of the inherent complexities of reverse payment
settlements in the Hatch-Waxman Act context, the Court concluded that the
settlement challenger should prove its case under a full rule of reason analysis.84
The Supreme Court created an approach that will be difficult to apply in
practice because is unclear how a full rule of reason analysis can be performed
without attempting to assess patent validity.85 It is also unclear what means for
reverse payments to be “large” and “unjustified,” the telltale signs of
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 2237
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
The Court remarked that it is “normally not necessary to litigate
patent validity to answer the antitrust question[.]” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
15

anticompetitive agreements according to the Court.86 The resulting high level of
uncertainty leaves the parties two equally undesirable choices: litigate the patent
dispute until a final judgment or risk highly uncertain and complex post-settlement
antitrust litigation. This situation can severely affect the economic choices of
innovator drug manufacturers and have serious repercussions on the
pharmaceutical industry. Of particular concern are the negative effects on the rate
of pharmaceutical innovation that result from insufficient patent protection.
III.

INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
One of the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance an increase in

generic competition with adequate incentives that would encourage the continued
innovation of new drugs.87 However, the Supreme Court’s decision is oddly devoid of
any consideration regarding the effects of increased uncertainty on future
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.
A.

Pharmaceutical research and development

Technological innovation is the essence of the pharmaceutical industry — one
of the most research-intensive sectors in the United States.88 The industry’s focus
on innovation is aptly illustrated by the estimated $48.5 billion spent on research
and development (“R&D”) by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of

86.
Id. at 2237.
87.
Henry G. Grabowski et al., Evolving Brand-Name and Generic Drug
Competition May Warrant a Revision of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS
2157, 2157 (2011).
88.
Dickey, supra note 12, at 369 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7-9 (2006)).
16

America (“PhRMA”) members in 2012.89 Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry
is a risky, costly, and time-consuming endeavor. Innovator firms place the largest
portion of their R&D effort into developing new chemical entities (NCE).90
Typically, developing a NCE is a process that requires several years. First,
considerable research is needed in order to synthesize a new compound. 91 Once a
new promising compound is discovered, it will be subject to screening for
pharmacological activity and toxicity, first in vitro and then in animals.92 If the
compound is still considered a promising candidate after the initial screening then
clinical trials will begin. Human testing normally occurs over three phases with
increasing numbers of test subjects. Phase I, designed to obtain toxicity information
and safe dosage ranges, is conducted on a small number of healthy volunteers.93
Phase II is aimed at proving the drug’s efficacy and is performed on a larger
number of individuals, usually in the hundreds, selected among those patients for
whom the drug is intended to be beneficial.94 Lastly, Phase III involves large-scale
testing on thousands of patients and is used to provide additional support to the
previous efficacy findings, as well as to detect possible side-effects.95

89.

PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFR. OF AM., 2013 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCH INDUSTRY PROFILE, 30 [hereinafter PhRMA].
90.
DiMasi et al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J.
HEALTH ECON. 107, 108 (1991)[hereinafter DiMasi I].
91.
Id. at 110.
92.
Id.
93.
DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimation of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 155 (2003)[hereinafter DiMasi II].
94.
Id. at 156.
95.
Id.
17

B.

Costs and success rates of pharmaceutical R&D

Typically, it takes about twelve years for a new medicine to complete the
R&D cycle from initial discovery to market launch.96 Further, only a small fraction
of the promising compounds tested in the pretrial phase are eventually brought to
market.97 Indeed, for every 5,000 compounds tested, on average only five will be
tested in clinical trials, and only one of those will receive final FDA approval.98
Given the complexity and length of the R&D effort, it is not surprising that
the costs of such endeavors are extremely high. Several studies, over different time
periods, have provided estimates of the R&D expenditures required to develop and
bring to market a new drug. Although several of these studies were based on
different data sources, taken together these studies point to a steeply rising cost of
R&D.99 After normalizing the various studies’ results to 2011 prices for comparison
purposes, the estimated cost of bringing a new drug to market was $199 million in
the late 1970s, $451 million in the early 1900s, $1,031 million in the early 2000s,
and $1,867 million in 2010.100 Such drastic increase is due, in large part, to the
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growth in the size and length of clinical trials and an increased failure rate.101 In
particular, research has focused increasingly on developing drugs for chronic
illnesses that require prolonged clinical trials.102
C.

Effects of generic competition

Brand-name drugs lose the majority of their sales to their generic equivalent.
The generic share of dispensed prescription drugs has steadily increased from the
time the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, growing from 18.6% in 1984 to 74.5% in
2009.103 Further, the rate of market-share erosion brand-name drugs suffer has
greatly accelerated over time. In the years immediately following the enactment of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, it took generic drugs about three to four years to obtain a
dominant share of the market.104 But by 2008, brand-name drugs on average
retained a market share of only 37% merely one month after generic entry, a figure

development costs and times and the effect of proposed regulatory changes, in ISSUES
IN PHARM. ECON. 151 (Robert I. Chien, ed., Lexington 1979); DiMasi I, supra note 90;
DiMasi II, supra note 93; Steven M. Paul et al., How to improve R&D productivity:
The pharmaceutical industry’s grand challenge, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG
DISCOVERY. 203 (2010)). All the studies mentioned included (1) discovery costs, i.e.
costs incurred during the pre-clinical trial stage; (2) the costs of unsuccessful
research projects, which accounted for the expenditures on projects that did not
result in a marketable drug; and (3) capitalized average costs, which were used to
calculate the opportunity cost of funds invested in the R&D process.
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that rapidly declined to 19% six months following generic entry.105 “Blockbuster”
drugs – drugs with average annual sales of more than $100 million – are even more
affected, as they suffer even faster market-share erosion.106 If on the one hand fast
market penetration of generic drugs allows for a reduction in healthcare costs, on
the other it produces undesirable results that, while difficult to quantify, might
more than offset the welfare gains due to lower prices.107 Specifically, one major
concern is whether innovator-drug manufacturers have the opportunity to
recuperate the costs of R&D, earn a positive return on that investment, and
maintain a steady rate of innovation.
D.

Protecting investments in pharmaceutical innovation

Patent laws are designed to encourage investments in research and
innovation. They attempt to do so by providing the patent holder the right to
exclude others from making, selling, or using the patented invention for a period of
twenty years from the date the patent was filed.108 Given the time, cost, and high
risk of failure of the R&D process, pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on
patents to protect their investment. The proceeds from the sale of a drug that is
successfully brought to market will not only repay the company’s shareholders for
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their investment, but also fund new research.109 For this reason, the
pharmaceutical industry is believed to depend on intellectual property rights more
than every other industry.110 Despite that, patents are a less effective method of
protecting an innovator firm’s investment in the pharmaceutical context than in
other industries.
First, while nominally a patent provides protection for twenty years, the
effective life of a patent111 is often less because patents are frequently obtained
before marketing.112 Estimates indicate that on average a patent will provide 18.5
years of effective patent life.113 The situation is even worse in the pharmaceutical
industry. Innovator firms normally apply for patents soon after the non-clinical
testing process; given the length of clinical trials and the time necessary to receive
FDA approval, pharmaceutical patents lose much of their nominal life before
marketing even begins.114 Recognizing this problem, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides restoration of the patent time lost in the regulatory review and clinical
testing.115 The Act, however, caps the length of the restoration period at five
years.116 Estimates indicate that, even accounting for the patent restoration period,
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the average effective patent life for new drugs is only 13.5 years.117 Furthermore,
the average effective patent life on blockbuster drugs is even shorter: approximately
11 years.118
Second, Paragraph IV challenges are one of the main factors responsible for
the discrepancy between nominal and effective patent life.119 Drugs that face
Paragraph IV challenges have an estimated reduction in effective patent life of two
years.120 Unsurprisingly, given the great economic incentives enjoyed by a generic
challenger, Paragraph IV certifications have been increasing in number.121
Furthermore, Paragraph IV challenges disproportionally target blockbuster
drugs.122 These drugs frequently have a great therapeutic value, as they are those
most likely to be first-in-class or best-in-class products, providing care for otherwise
unmet medical needs.123 In addition, brand name manufacturers are critically
dependent on the revenues from blockbuster drugs in order to earn positive returns
on their R&D efforts.124 Given their tremendous importance from both a medical
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and economic perspective then, blockbuster drugs are those most in need of effective
intellectual property protection. Despite this, these drugs are 59% more likely to
face Paragraph IV challenges than other drugs and are often challenged early on
after their market launch.125
Therefore, patents in the pharmaceutical industry are a less effective method
of protecting an innovator firm’s investment than in other industries because they
guarantee fewer years of market exclusivity. First, a good portion of a
pharmaceutical patent’s life is lost during the pre-marketing years of clinical trials
and the FDA approval process. Second, the increasing number of Paragraph IV
challenges further reduces the estimated market exclusivity period, especially for
those drugs more likely to earn positive returns and fuel new investments in R&D.
IV.

PROMOTING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
Because of the high costs and risks of developing new drugs, pharmaceutical

manufacturers need reliable intellectual property protections. As we have seen,
however, patents are not as effective a mean of protecting investments in
pharmaceutical innovation as they are in other industries. The Actavis decision
further diminishes the value provided by pharmaceutical patents because it
increases the uncertainty tied to patent litigation in the Hatch-Waxman context.
While the Hatch-Waxman Act intended to strike a balance between promoting
competition and innovation, the interplay of the Act’s provisions may have had the
effect of tipping the scale too much in favor of the former. To avoid the consequence
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of severely limiting new drug development, it may be necessary to rethink the
incentive structure provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act.
A.

Effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act on the rate of innovation

As we have seen, R&D of pharmaceuticals is a costly, lengthy, and risky
process. For this reason, for every new drug successfully brought to market,
manufacturers need a correspondingly lengthy period of time to earn a positive riskadjusted return on the R&D investment.126 For most drugs, the data exclusivity
period of five years provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act is not enough to recuperate
the R&D costs and earn a positive return.127 In fact, it is estimated that it takes
about six years for most drugs to start earning positive marginal returns. 128 As a
consequence, only about 20% of brand name drugs earn sufficient revenues to
recoup average R&D costs.129 Therefore, the Hatch-Waxman Act – featuring a short
data exclusivity period, a streamlined approval process favoring early generic entry,
and substantial rewards to generic manufacturers who challenge patents – has
created an even greater uncertainty as to whether innovators may recover an
appropriate return on their research investments.

126. Grabowski, supra note 87, at 2163.
127. Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe, Impact of Economic, Regulatory
and Patent Policies on innovation in Cancer Chemoprevention, ECON. DEP’T DUKE
UNIV. (2007), http://www.econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/BarrierWorkingPaper.
128. Morris, supra note 1, at 258.
129. John A. Vernon et al., Drug development costs when financial risk is
measured using the Fama-French three-factor model, 19 HEALTH ECON. LETTERS
1002, 1004 (2010).
24

Furthermore, pharmaceutical R&D is predominantly funded by internal
financing sources.130 That is because the combination of the length of the R&D
process, the great uncertainty about the R&D outcomes, and the information
asymmetries between drug manufacturers and outside investors make external
funds difficult to obtain and extremely costly.131 For this reason, two major factors
affecting pharmaceutical manufacturers’ R&D investment behavior are the
availability of internal funds and the expected returns on the R&D investment.132
By affecting both of these factors, the Hatch-Waxman Act has had the unintended
consequence of severely limiting new drug development.133 First, the HatchWaxman Act greatly facilitates early market entry of generics which, since the Act’s
enactment, have eroded brand manufacturers’ revenues at an alarmingly increasing
rate.134 The reduction in brand manufacturers’ cash flows resulting from generics’
market penetration decreases the availability of internal funds used to finance new
research. Empirically, experts have calculated that a 10% increase in generic
penetration decreases the flow of early-stage innovation by 7.3%.135 Second, by
increasing the uncertainty concerning pharmaceutical patents, the Hatch-Waxman
130. Henry G. Grabowski & John A. Vernon, The Determinants of
Pharmaceutical Research and Development Expenditures, 10 J. EVOL. ECON. 201,
207 (2000).
131. Id.
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133. Matthew J. Higgins & Stuart J. H. Graham, Balancing Innovation and
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products is a suitable proxy for measuring pharmaceutical manufacturers’ efforts to
innovate.
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Act lowers the expected return on R&D investments.136 A reduction in the expected
value of pharmaceutical patents decreases drug manufacturers’ incentives to
engage in the highly risky and expensive R&D process. Indeed, experts have
estimated that a 10% increase in Paragraph IV challenges leads to a 3.9% decrease
in early-stage innovation.137
B.

Longer exclusivity periods: the case of biologics

In recent years, advances in molecular biology have stimulated the
development of large molecule biologic-based pharmaceutical products.138
Pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly have been attracted to biologics, not
only because of their great potential to provide breakthrough therapies, but also for
the economic benefits they offer.139 In particular, unlike conventional chemicalbased drugs, brand-name biologics face virtually no competition from generic
imitations or biosimilars.140 There are two main reasons contributing to the lack of
generic competition. First, the manufacturing of biologics is more difficult and
subject to greater regulatory requirements than the manufacturing of chemicalbased drugs.141 Second, while biosimilars can be close substitutes to the branded
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biologics of reference, they are not chemically identical and therefore not completely
interchangeable.142
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress
created an abbreviated pathway for biosimilars, similar to the one for generic drugs
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.143 As Congress tried to balance proper incentives for
innovation with consumer interests, it extensively debated the appropriate length of
the data exclusivity period to be afforded to innovator manufacturers.144 As a
consequence of that debate, the ACA grants a new innovative biologic twelve years
of data exclusivity.145 Therefore, the data exclusivity period for biologics is now
much longer than for new chemical entities.146 Data exclusivity provides a form of
intellectual property protection that is considerably stronger than patents because
it is not subject to legal challenges.147 Longer data exclusivity periods for biologics,
coupled with the increasingly uncertain outcomes of Paragraph IV challenges, raise
the question of whether the incentives for future innovation are artificially skewed
in favor of biologics.
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The current regulatory environment has produced strong economic incentives
to shift the focus of research to biologics.148 Pharmaceutical manufacturers already
seem to be responding to these incentives, as biologics account for almost half of all
drugs currently being tested in clinical trials.149 In the long run this shift could have
severe negative repercussions on healthcare costs because biologics are significantly
more expensive to produce than chemical-based drugs.150 Extending the period of
data exclusivity for chemical-based drugs to match the period afforded to biologics
might help to counterbalance these effects. Estimates indicate that increasing the
data exclusivity period to twelve years would produce a 5% increase in the expected
revenues generated over a drug’s lifetime.151 Empirical evidence strongly supports
the notion that profits drive innovation.152 Accordingly, experts estimate that a data
exclusivity period for chemical-based drugs extended to twelve years could result in
an additional 228 drug approvals between 2020 and 2060.153 Therefore, when given
longer data exclusivity periods, manufacturers would be more likely to pursue many
promising new therapies that otherwise might not be developed.
C.

A system of combined incentives: the orphan drugs example

Stimulating innovation was the primary motivation behind another widely
debated legislation: the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 (“ODA”).154 The ODA was
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designed to encourage the development of so called “orphan drugs” – drugs that are
useful for a rare disease or condition – by providing a series of economic incentives.
The statute defines a rare condition as one (1) that affects fewer than 200,000
individuals within the United States; or (2) for which there is no reasonable
expectation to recover the costs of making and marketing a drug.155 An orphan drug
is one that manufacturers were typically unwilling to take through the lengthy and
costly FDA approval process because, given the rareness of the condition that it is
meant to treat, has a very small likelihood to generate positive returns. To
overcome such great economic deterrent, the ODA created a system combining four
types of incentives. First, it makes available a grants program to help defray the
costs of testing and clinical trials.156 Second, it provides FDA advice and counseling
on the protocol of tests and experiments the drug sponsor needs to complete to gain
marketing approval.157 Third, it establishes a tax credit for fifty percent of the
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amounts spent performing clinical trials.158 Fourth, it guarantees a seven-year
market exclusivity period.159
The ODA provisions stimulate investments in the development of orphan
drugs in two ways. The first three ODA provisions effectively subsidize research
inputs, thereby lowering the cost of pharmaceutical R&D. The last provision helps
reduce the risk associated with pharmaceutical R&D because, by barring early
generic entry, it guarantees manufacturers a longer period of time to earn positive
returns on their investments. This combination of incentives has unquestionably
been successful in stimulating the development of drugs for rare diseases. While
only a handful of such drugs were available before the passage of the act, by 2007
the FDA had designated 1,793 orphan products; 322 of these having received
marketing approval.160
V.

CONCLUSION
Balancing consumer interests with sufficient incentives to foster

pharmaceutical innovation is not an easy task. On the one hand, there is a critical
need to curtail healthcare costs and increase drug accessibility. On the other,
regulatory policies that affect the returns of pharmaceuticals, and in particular of
blockbuster drugs, can have significantly negative consequences on the rate of
innovation in the industry. Long-term trends in the industry, as well as more recent
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developments, make it highly questionable whether patents remain the most
appropriate form of intellectual property protection for pharmaceutical products. To
avoid the consequence of severely limiting new drug development, it might be
necessary to rethink the incentive structure provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. A
mixed-incentives system could be devised to replace what is currently in place. The
new system could not only offer pharmaceutical innovator firms a greater likelihood
of recovering R&D expenses – through longer statutorily-granted exclusivity periods
– but also lower the costs of research by offering a tax credit for amounts spent on
research. These types of incentives have proven to be extremely successful in niche
areas of the pharmaceutical industry and could help restore the proper balance
sought when the Hatch-Waxman Act was originally enacted.
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